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RECENT DECISIONS
Constitutional Law: Academic Freedom: Some Tentative Guide-
lines-The extent to which a teacher's choice of subject matter and
method of instruction are protected as elements of free speech
under the first and fourteenth amendments has been a subject of
recent judicial concern. How free is a teacher to choose the method
and the subject matter of his classes? Under what conditions may
a teacher be dismissed for his choices? What are the due process
requirements for such a dismissal? These are the kinds of questions
with which the courts have had to deal.
The traditional view had been that the teacher was a mere
employee of the state, and, as such, was subject to arbitrary restric-
tion of subject matter and method under penalty of summary dis-
missal. This view is exemplified by the position of the Tennessee
Supreme Court in its review of the famous Scopes Monkey Trial:'
[Scopes] was a teacher in the public schools of Rhea County. He
was an employee of the state of Tennessee or of a municipal
agency of the state. . . . He had no right or privilege to serve
the state except upon such terms as the state prescribed ...
In dealing with its own employees engaged upon its own
work, the state is not hampered by the limitations of. . . the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States.2
This traditional view was specifically overruled in a case concern-
ing a more general anti-evolution statute. In Epperson v.
Arkansas3 the United States Supreme Court held that:
The State's undoubted right to prescribe the curriculum for its
public schools does not carry with it the right to prohibit, on pain
of criminal penalty, the teaching of a scientific theory or doctrine
where that prohibition is based upon reasons that violate the
First Amendment. It is much too late to argue that the State may
impose upon the teachers in its schools any conditions that it
chooses, however restrictive they may be of constitutional guar-
antees.4
1. Scopes v. State, 154 Tenn. 105, 289 S.W. 363 (1927).
2. Id. at I 11, 289 S.W. at 364. The court reversed on other grounds.
3. 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
4. Id. at 107.
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In 1969 the Supreme Court further emphasized its break with the
traditional view, when it stated that the issue of first amendment
rights for teachers was no longer in dispute, and that "[i]t can
hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed their consti-
tutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the school-
house gate." But while the issue of the applicability of constitu-
tional rights was no longer in dispute, the question of the extent
of those rights was still unresolved.
There are few cases that deal with the extent of academic free-
dom, and fewer still that discuss academic freedom as applied to
the teacher. A recent United States district court case, Mailloux
v. Kiley,6 has set forth procedural guidelines and has discussed the
limits of the academic freedom of a teacher. Relying primarily on
a federal court of appeals case, Keefe v. Geanakos,7 and another
district court case, Parducci v. Rutland,8 Mailloux delineates a
very narrow procedural protection for a teacher, coupled with very
limited constitutional right.
The three cases have similar fact situations, in that they all
concern the discussion or assignment of shocking or offensive sub-
ject matter. Keefe involved the discussion of an article in the
Atlantic Monthly9 assigned to twelfth grade students by their Eng-
lish teacher, who was also the head of the high school English
department. During the discussion, the teacher mentioned a partic-
ular word, a vulgar term for an incestuous son, which appeared in
the article. He explained the word's origin, its context, and the
reasons the author used the word in the article. The next evening
the teacher was called to a meeting of the school committee and
was asked to defend his discussion of the offending word. He also
was asked to refrain from using the word in his classroom. He
replied that he could not, in good conscience, agree to refrain,
although in point of fact he did not use it again. Later he was
suspended and it was proposed that he be discharged. The court
of appeals upheld his substantive first amendment right as a
teacher to be free to choose subject matter which, in the court's
view, served a demonstrated educational purpose. The court con-
5. Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506
(1969).
6. 323 F. Supp. 1387 (D. Mass. 1971).
7. 418 F.2d 359 (1st Cir. 1969).
8. 316 F. Supp. 352 (M.D. Ala. 1970).




[T]he question in this case is whether a teacher may, for demon-
strated educational purposes, quote a "dirty" word currently
used in order to give special offense, or whether the shock is too
great for high school seniors to stand. If the answer were that the
students must be protected from such exposure we would fear for
their future. We do not question the good faith of the defendants
[the school committee] in believing that some parents have been
offended. With the greatest of respect to such parents, their sensi-
bilities are not the full measure of what is proper education.'
While Keefe upheld a teacher's substantive right to choose his
own subject matter, Parducci looked to both procedural and sub-
stantive rights of a teacher. The case concerned a high school
teacher who assigned as outside reading a short story entitled
"Welcome to the Monkey House," by Kurt Vonnegut, Jr., to her
eleventh grade English class. The following morning she was called
into the principal's office and admonished for assigning the story
and was ordered not to assign it again. The teacher replied that she
considered the story suitable and had a professional obligation to
use the story, and then tendered her resignation. Later a hearing
was held, and two weeks after the incident the teacher was notified
that she had been dismissed. It was made clear at the time of
notification that her teaching ability was not in question, but that
it was her refusal to agree to stop assigning the short story that
led to her dismissal. In response to the teacher's request for injunc-
tive relief, a United States district court found that her dismissal
violated due process requirements because of the lack of notice as
to the standards to be used in determining whether a story was
suitable or not. The court stated:
In the case now before the Court, we are concerned not merely
with vague standards, but with the total absence of standards.
When a teacher is forced to speculate as to what conduct is
proscribed, he is apt to be overly cautious and reserved in the
classroom. Such a reluctance on the part of the teacher to
investigate and experiment with new and different ideas is anath-
ema to the entire concept of academic freedom."
Going beyond the purely procedural requirements, the court
10. 418 F.2d at 361.
11. 316 F. Supp. at 357.
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sought to specify a standard that would distinguish what was an
appropriate subject or teaching method from one that was inappro-
priate. The district court looked to the Supreme Court decision in
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District.1 2
In that case the Supreme Court set guidelines for determining what
constituted protected student behavior. The Court said that in
order for the state to restrict the first amendment rights of a stu-
dent, it must first demonstrate that "the forbidden conduct 'would
materially and substantially interfere with the requirements of ap-
propriate discipline in the operation of the school.' "13 This district
court took this standard of student behavior and applied it to the
teacher. Thus, the court held that in order to restrict a teacher's
first amendment rights the state must show that the teacher's
choice of subject matter or method of instruction "materially and
substantially" disrupts classwork or involves disorder or the inva-
sion of the rights of others. When the court applied this standard
to the facts in Parducci it concluded that the teacher's choice of a
Vonnegut short story did not violate the standard and was pro-
tected behavior.
Mailloux v. Kiley, the most recent lower court case on the
academic freedom of a teacher, concerned a high school teacher
who was suspended, and later discharged, for writing a slang word
for sexual intercourse on the blackboard and then discussing it as
an example of a taboo word during the course of a class discussion
of an assigned book. After the incident the teacher was given a
hearing by the school committee and a day later was dismissed on
a general charge of "conduct unbecoming a teacher." Following
his discharge, the teacher successfully sought a temporary injunc-
tion ordering the school committee to restore him to his employ-
ment. The school committee appealed and asked for a stay pending
appeal. The court of appeals denied the stay and dismissed the
appeal. 4 On rehearing, the district court found for the teacher and
entered a judgment directing: that the teacher be employed until
the end of the academic year, that his employment records be
purged of all references to suspension and discharge, that he be
compensated for his loss of salary with interest from the date of
the complaint, and that the school committee pay costs.
12. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
13. Id. at 509, quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966).
14. Mailloux v. Kiley, 436 F.2d 565 (1st Cir. 1971).
[Vol. 55
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In its reasoning, the district court differentiated the Mailloux
case and previous academic freedom cases. Mailloux was distin-
guished from Epperson by the fact that the
teaching methods plaintiff [Mailloux] used were obviously not
'necessary' to the proper teaching of the subject and the students
assigned to him in the sense that a reference to Darwinian evolu-
tion might be thought necessary to the teaching of biology.' 5
The Court indicated that the determination of whether a method
is "necessary" is dependent upon the unanimity of professional
opinion. The teaching of Darwinian evolution was thought neces-
sary because the experts agree as to its merits. Where the experts
are divided, however, the court felt that no necessity could be
found. With reference to the offensive word used in Mailloux, the
court said:
There is substantial support from expert witnesses of undoubted
competence that the discussion of taboo words was relevant to
an assigned book, and whether or not so relevant, was at least
relevant to the subject of eleventh grade English. . . .Yet there
was also substantial evidence, chiefly from persons with experi-
ence as principals but also from the head of the English depart-
ment at the plaintiffs school, that it was inappropriate to use the
particular word under the circumstances of this case."6
Thus, the district court would not rule on the necessity of the
discussion of taboo words in a high school English class because
of the differing views of the expert witnesses.
The court also distinguished Mailloux from both Keefe and
Parducci on substantive grounds:
Nor is this case. . . one where the court, from its own evalu-
ation of the teaching method used, may conclude that, even if the
court would not use the method, it is plainly permissible. . . at
least in the absence of an express proscription. 7
In those cases the teachers gave reading assignments which con-
tained offensive material but which were in no sense obscene, and
were, in fact, from noted authors. In Mailloux the teacher was not
discussing a word on a printed page but chose his own example of
a taboo word. In addition, his asking the class to define the word
15. 323 F. Supp. at 1390.
16. Id. at 1390.
17. Id. at 1390.
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created an area of possible abuse. The court said:
When a male teacher asks a class of adolescent boys and girls to
define a taboo sexual word the question must not go beyond
asking for verbal knowledge and become a titillating probe of
privacy. . . . Here . . . there is no evidence that this plaintiff
transcended legitimate professional purposes. Indeed, the court
has specifically found he acted in good faith. But the risk of abuse
involved in the technique of questioning students precludes this
court from concluding that the method was plainly permissible.
Too much depends on the context and the teacher's good faith. 18
Thus the court distinguished Mailloux from all the previous cases
as one where the subject matter and method were neither 'neces-
sary,' in the Epperson sense, nor plainly permissible, as the court
found them to be in Keefe and Parducci, but merely relevant to
the subject being taught.
The court recognized a further distinction, one which had not
been expressly stated in previous cases. It introduced as a guideline
the proposition that the extent of a teacher's academic freedom
may be dependent upon the educational level at which he teaches.
The court indicated that the secondary school situation was clearly
distinguishable from higher levels of education on several grounds:
1) that the secondary school acts more clearly in loco parentis with
respect to its minor pupils; 2) that the faculty does not have inde-
pendent traditions,'the broad discretion, nor the intellectual quali-
fications of university professors; 3) that the students have limited
intellectual and emotional maturity; 4) that the secondary school
concentrates on the transmission of basic information and the
mores of the surrounding society; and 5) that the secondary school
student is required to attend classes and may have no choice as to
his teacher. On these grounds the court concluded that the aca-
demic freedom, the freedom to choose both method and subject
matter, of the secondary school teacher should be more limited
than that of a college or university instructor.
By way of dicta the court stated that the secondary school
teacher's substantive rights might be limited to the right to be free
from discriminating religious, racial, and political measures and
from state action which is unreasonable, or perhaps only those
state actions that are without a plausible rational basis. 9 In a
18. Id. at 1391.
19. Id. at 1392.
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footnote to the case the court, citing Epperson and the dissent in
Tinker, commented:
It may be that it will be held by the Supreme Court that the
teacher's academic right to liberty in teaching methods in the
classroom (unlike his civic right to freedom of speech) is subject
to state regulatory control which is not actuated by compelling
public interests but which, in the judiciary's opinion, is merely
'reasonable.'. . . Indeed it has been suggested that state regula-
tory control of the classroom is entitled to prevail unless the
teacher bears the heavy burden of proving that it has no rational
justification. 0
While these comments were merely dicta, they still represent a
drastic change from the guideline in Parducci that the constitu-
tional rights of the teacher could be restricted only where the
choice of subject matter or method "would materially and substan-
tially interfere with" the requirements of appropriate discipline.2'
It was the supposition as to what the Supreme Court might decide
that controlled the remainder of the decision, at least in terms of
its practical effect.
The court, relying on the procedural ruling in Parducci, ex-
tended an exclusively procedural protection to a teacher whose
choice of subject matter and method is merely relevant. The court
held that a teacher must have had notice of the fact that his choice
was proscribed before he can be disciplined for using it. But in a
very narrowly worded ruling the court said:
[W]hen a secondary school teacher uses a teaching method which
he does not prove has the support of the preponderant opinion
of the teaching profession or of the part of it to which he belongs,
but which he merely proves is relevant to his subject and students,
is regarded by experts of significant standing as serving a serious
educational purpose, and was used by him in good faith the state
may suspend or discharge a teacher for using that method but it
may not resort to such drastic sanctions unless the state proves
he was put on notice either by regulation or otherwise that he
should not use that method. 22
While this ruling did expand the due process requirement of notice
to a teacher choosing subject matter or a method that is merely
20. Id. at 1391 n.4.
21. 316 F. Supp. at 356.
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relevant, it also sanctioned the suspension or discharge of a teacher
who has notice of a prohibition but refuses to stop. This means that
unless a secondary school teacher could prove not only that his
choice was relevant, but also that the preponderant opinion of the
teaching profession supported his choice as both relevant and ap-
propriate, he could be suspended or discharged for continuing to
use it once he had been given notice of its prohibition.
In a practical sense, this ruling may have a chilling effect on
any classroom experimentation, no matter how relevant and ap-
propriate. Once a teacher has had notice that a particular method
is not approved, it would be unrealistic to assume that he would
risk suspension and dismissal on the probability that the prepon-
derant opinion of the teaching profession would support his choice.
Assuming, arguendo, that a teacher was certain that the prepon-
derant opinion of at least that part of the teaching profession to
which he belonged would support him, he still could be suspended
or dismissed if he continued to use the method, and all he could
gain after costly and lengthy litigation would be reinstatement,
back pay with interest, and the vindication of his right to use the
prohibited method. A teacher would for all practical purposes be
deterred by Mailloux from challenging any restriction on his
choice of subject matter or method of instruction. The effect of the
decision is in conformity with what the district court saw as the
probable position that the Supreme Court would take on a like
case.
The court did rule that the dismissal of the teacher was a viola-
tion of due process, since the teacher had had no notice that the
method he used was prohibited. The court held that:
Inasmuch as at the time he acted plaintiff did not know, and
there was no reason that he should have known, that his conduct
was proscribed, it was a violation of due process for the defen-
dants to suspend or discharge him on that account.23
Mailloux indicates with some degree of clarity the procedural
protection afforded'to a secondary school teacher. The same proce-
dural requirements for due process must be observed with regard
to a college or university instructor. Assuming good faith on the
part of the educator and the relevance of the subject matter or
22. 323 F. Supp. at 1392.
23. Id. at 1393.
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method, neither a secondary school teacher, nor a college instruc-
tor can be suspended or discharged for his choice of subject matter
or his use of a particular method without prior notice of its
proscription.
With regard to the substantive aspect of academic freedom as
applied to higher education, Mailloux is less clear. The very fact
that the court distinguished between secondary and higher educa-
tion lends support for a broader substantive freedom at the college
or university level. But the substantive freedom at the college or
university level is not without restriction. Whether, as the court
suggested, the instructor's freedom is to be limited to choosing
"among options for which there is any substantial support" 4 or
whether some other standard may be more appropriate is a ques-
tion that was beyond the scope of Mailloux, and remains unan-
swered.
BRADLEY J. KEITH
Secured Transactions: Address as a Formal Requisite of the Financ-
ing Statement-The Uniform Commercial Code adopted the no-
tice filing system, calling simply for a notice indicating that the
secured party who has filed may have a security interest.' The
document filed, however, must satisfy the information requisites of
section 9-402(1).2 But how strictly are its provisions construed?
In Burlington National Bank v. Strauss,3 the Wisconsin Su-
preme Court was asked to determine whether a purchase money
lender, Strauss, had perfected his security interest so as to enable
his interest to take priority over the bank's standard form security
24. Id. at 1391.
1. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-402, Comment 2.
2. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-402(1):
A financing statement is sufficient if it is signed by the debtor and the secured party,
gives an address of the secured party from which information concerning the security
interest may be obtained, gives a mailing address of the debtor and contains a
statement indicating the types, or describing the items, of collateral. A financing
statement may be filed before a security agreement is made or a security interest
otherwise attaches. . . .A copy of the security agreement is sufficient as a financing
statement if it contains the above information and is signed by both parties.
3. 50 Wis. 2d 270, 184 N.W.2d 122 (1971).
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